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§1　Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the human mind has been considered to be a highly 
controversial one in his Ethics by many interpreters of Spinoza’s philosophy.　The dificulty 
with the doctrine lies in the fact that it seems inconsistent with another doctrine in his philoso-
phy, namely what is caled Mind-Body Paralelism.
In Proposition 23 of Part Five of the Ethics Spinoza says: “The human mind cannot be 
absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there remains of it something that is eternal.”2)　
Taken literaly, Spinoza seems to assert that there is an eternal part in the human mind.
On the other hand, according to the Mind-Body Paralelism implied by the wel known 
Proposition 7 of Part Two, the human mind must be destroyed at the same time as the corelative 
human body is destroyed.　This seems to imply that there is no eternal part in the human mind 
so long as there is no eternal part in the corelative human body.
A Cambridge philosopher C. D. Broad once said in his Five Types of Ethical Theory: 
“That Spinoza was right in thinking that these experiences [= certain religious and mystical 
exeriences] are of the utmost importance and that philosophy must deal seriously with them I 
have no doubt; but I am equaly sure that his theory of them is not consistent with the rest of his 
system.” (Broad [1959], p. 16).
Also, Jonathan Benet, one of the representative Spinoza scholars of our time, says about 
the part where the doctrine in question is developed, in his A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics: “After 
three centuries of failure to profit from it [= the second half of Part Five of the Ethics], the time 
has come to admit that this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us and is prety certainly 
worthless.” (Bennet [1980], p. 372).
§2　I admit that Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the human mind means something incon-
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sistent with his Mind-Body Paralelism, as long as it is literaly understood.　However, in this 
short paper I would like to assert that there is another interpretation of that doctrine which is 
consistent with the Mind-Body Paralelism.
I wil begin to explain this new interpretation with a parable.　The parable consists in imag-
ining that the hero of Hamlet should begin to think about the author of the drama in which he 
exists.
Let’s imagine that Hamlet, prince of Denmark, should be awakened, as it were, after, for 
example, he said to Ophelia, “Get thee to a nunnery”, and say to himself, “Al my words are in 
truth composed by a British dramatist named Wiliam Shakespeare in 1601”.　Of course, this is 
an uncommon, even grotesque imagination, because a person belonging to a story is imagined 
to avert his interest from that story whose part he is and begin to think about the author of the 
whole story.　And what is more striking is that, if he began to think about the author, Hamlet 
should be conscious that the above-mentioned line “Al my words are in truth composed by a 
British dramatist named Wiliam Shakespeare in 1601” is itself composed by the very dramatist 
Wiliam Shakespeare.　Therefore Hamlet in this situation should consider al his words with no 
exception as emited not from himself but from Shakespeare.
Now, what part of the history should this Awakened Hamlet feel himself belonging to?　
Should he feel himself belonging to the Middle Ages as the story is supposed to be?　By no 
means, because the Awakened Hamlet should be no more thinking about any person or any 
event around him belonging to the Middle Ages, but about Shakespeare writing the drama 
Hamlet in 1601.　Therefore he should feel himself belonging to the year of his being invented 
by Shakespeare, that is to say, the year 1601.
§3　With the doctrine of the eternity of the human mind, Spinoza intends to explain the 
“excelence and utility” (Scholium to Proposition 47 of Part Two) of the third kind of 
knowledge.　The third kind of knowledge is, in Spinoza’s definition, knowledge which 
“proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain atributes of God to the 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things” (Second Scholium to Proposition 40 of Part Two). 
In comparison with the parable of the Awakened Hamlet, I would like to see what the 
“excelence and utitily” of the third kind of knowledge consists in.
Ordinarily, the human mind thinks about singular persons and events around itself without 
thinking about the true cause of the world whose part it is, just as the Not-Yet-Awakened 
Hamlet thinks about singular persons and events around himself without thinking about the 
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author of the drama whose part he is.　But when the human mind knows itself and other 
singular things through the third kind of knowledge, it thinks about the true cause of them, just 
as the Awakened Hamlet should think about the author of the drama.　In other words, when the 
human mind has the third kind of knowledge about itself and other singular things, it thinks that 
these singular things are what God as the unique causa sui produces by producing himself.　At 
this moment, the human mind averts its interest from the vague association of things, namely 
the object of the first kind of knowledge, and from the lawful connexion of things, namely the 
object of the second kind of knolwdge.　Instead, the human mind becomes conscious of the 
causal relationship between singular things and their true eficient cause, that is, God as the 
unique causa sui.　And the human mind must be also conscious that the knowledge “These 
singular things are what God produces by producing himself”, too, is produced by that God.　
Then, what wil the human mind feel is the subject which has the knowledge “These singular 
things are what God produces by producing himself”?　Certainly the human mind wil feel that 
the knowledge proceeds from that God although it comes only by way of its intelect.　
Furthermore the human mind wil feel itself not existing in 2007, nor in any passage of time, 
but belonging to the species of time in which God as the unique causa sui produces himself and 
everything in the world, that is to say, the species of eternity.　In fact Spinoza says: “We feel 
and know by experience that we are eternal” (Scholium to Proposition 23 of Part Five).
§4　It is true that the Awakened Hamlet is a rough parable, because the ontological status of 
Shakespeare and that of God are quite diferent.　Shakespeare is a mode and God is a substance 
in Spinoza’s metaphysical terminology.　However, this parable is of great use when one tries to 
grasp the gist of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the human mind.　Spinoza intends to say 
that the third kind of knowledge causes a dramatic change in the human way of thinking about 
time.
Ordinarily, time is real as the order of events, for example, the precedence of Hamlet’s 
refusal of Ophelia to her suicide.　But as long as Hamlet were awakened about the existence of 
Shakespeare as the cause of the drama whose part he is, time taken as the order of events would 
not seem real to him.　Instead, Hamlet would consider himself belonging to the time of 
Shakespear’s writing Hamlet.　Spinoza means to say that a similar thing wil occur when the 
human mind has the third kind of knowledge in his intelect.　The gist of the doctrine of the 
eternity of the human mind is that precisely at this moment the human intelect begins to be 
conscious that it belongs to the time of the causation of the unique substance, namely eternity.
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The third kind of knowledge not only causes a dramatic change in the human way of 
thinking about time, but also in the human afective activity.　According to Spinoza, “The 
greatest striving of the Mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of 
knowledge” (Proposition 25 of Part Five).　Therefore, the human mind takes the highest 
pleasure when this kind of knowledge occurs in it.　Moreovere, because that highest pleasure is 
accompanied by the idea of God as a cause, it has to become an intelectual love of God (“amor 
Dei intelectualis”).　Besides, the human mind enjoying an intelectual love of God wil feel 
that love coming from God, just as the Awakened Hamlet should feel his lines coming from 
Shakespeare.　In other words, the human mind enjoying an intelectual love toward God wil 
feel that his own love toward God is no diferent from the love by which God loves himself.　
In Spinoza’s words, “the Mind’s intelectual Love of God is part of the infinite Love by which 
God loves himself” (Proposition 36 of Part Five).
§5　Although Spinoza says in Proposition 23 of Part Five: “The human mind cannot be 
absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there remains of it something that is eternal.”, I 
don’t interpret him saying literaly that there is an eternal part in the human mind.　If he is 
taken in that way, he must be considered to be incoherent as many scholars, C. D. Broad 
included, assert.　My interpretation is that Spinoza intends to assert that the human mind feels 
itself belonging to eternity when it knows singular things through the third kind of knowledge.　
It is “excelence and utility” of that kind of knowledge to enable the human mind to feel itself 
belonging to eternity.　Here, eternity is the species of time in which God produces everything 
in the world by producing himself.
Indeed, what it means to feel oneself belonging to eternity is not at al easy to understand. 
Spinoza himself has much trouble in explaining it in geometrical exposition.　Prety certainly it 
wil be hopeless to give exclusive atention to formal details in Spinoza’s argument in order to 
understand his doctrine of the eternity of the human mind.　In the belief that a quite diferent 
way of reading is needed, in this short paper I have had recourse to a parable that consists in 
imagining Hamlet to begin to think about Shakespeare.　This way of interpreting Spinoza is 
surely a kind of experiment.　The degree of the success of this experiment depends on how 
plausible an interpretation it brings for the doctrine in question.
§6　Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the human mind and the intelectual love of God is 
esoteric enough to perplex most readers of the Ethics.　Just because Spinoza himself is aware 
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of this esotericity, he remarks in Propostion 41 of Part Five something to the efect that it is 
possible to understand his ethical theory developped in Part Four and the first half of Part Five 
without grasping that doctrine.　However, grasping that doctrine is undoubtedly necessary to 
understand what Spinoza cals “the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of 
Nature (cognitio unionis quam mens cum tota Natura habet)” in Section 13 of the Treatise on 
the Emendation of the Intelect, in other words, what he cals “salvation (salus)” in the penulti-
mate sentence of the Ethics.
The traditional concept of transient God has no part in Spinoza’s metaphysics.　In a world 
without transient God, naturaly, there is no possibility for the human mind to be saved by 
transient God.　Spinoza is fuly aware of how revolutionary his philosophy is because of this 
lack of traditional God.　Therefore, no mater how “dificult” and “rare” it may be, Spinoza 
must stress at the end of the Ethics that it is possible for the human mind to feel its own eternity 
and love God intelectualy.　For him, the doctrine of the eternity of the human mind is nothing 
but an indispensable compensation for what is definitely lost in his metaphysical revolution.
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